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Introduction
When the issue of climate change becomes more and more severe, as it is, world-wide collective action is seen indispensible. In the literature, a number of mechanisms have been proposed for how climate coalitions may be formed voluntarily to achieve an effective mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions. Typically, multilateral cooperation among countries is institutionalised in the form of international environmental agreements (IEAs) such as the Paris Agreement and its predecessors. The international community has acknowledged that incentives to offset free-riding are crucial and should be provided to countries. In the Paris Agreement, for instance, side payments (climate finance) as well as technology transfers and capacity building in the field of mitigation and adaptation are among the incentive measures for emission reduction that have been addressed.
However, the idea of coupling mitigation efforts to other treaty mechanisms in order to raise participation in IEAs and their effectiveness is not new at all and has been proposed in the game-theoretic literature since the early 1990s. The motivation throughout has been to improve on the rather pessimistic propositions in the non-cooperative literature (e.g. Hoel, 1992 , Carraro/Siniscalco, 1993 , and Barrett, 1994 , stating that self-enforcing IEAs can only be implemented under fairly strong restrictions. Either the number of signatories must not be too large or the signatories need to commit to just fairly lax emission reduction targets, compared to the business-as-usual emission scenario. Put differently, there appears to be a trade-off between the effectiveness of an IEA and its stability (Finus, 2003) which must be overcome by an appropriate incentive instrument.
In this respect, various transfer mechanisms have been examined extensively and their scope to improve the prospects of cooperation 4 are found rather limited, although the results may highly depend on the specific design of the allocation rules and of the process of coalition formation.
For this reason, attention has also been paid to the mechanism of issue linkage (e.g. by Carraro /Siniscalco, 1995 , 2001 , Carraro, 1999 , and Carraro/Marchiori, 2003a which entails the linkage of the public-good agreement on climate change to other policy issues, particularly to the joint provision of a club good. The idea is that the benefits of enjoying the club good can off-set the incentive to free-ride on the environment (Botteon/Carraro, 1998) .
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In general, following the dichotomy introduced by Ederington (2010) , the literature on issue linkage can be classified into the two types of negotiation linkage and enforcement linkage, according to the focus of the analysis. Contributions to the first category are typically aimed at studying the impact of cross-issue negotiation on the process of coalition building, either choosing R&D cooperation 6 or trade liberalisation 7 . By contrast, in the second category, issue linkage is understood as the possibility of cross-issue retaliation in order to enforce international cooperation among countries within an existing agreement. Most prominently, trade sanctions are given consideration using a strategic trade framework (e.g. in Abrego et al., 2001 , Ederington, 2002 , Bajona/Ederington, 2012 , and Limão, 2005 . It is evident that this notion of linkage to trade policy issues is quite similar to the related approach of border tax adjustments that have become a popular means to combat carbon leakage (see e.g. Bucher/Schenker, 2010 and Fischer/Fox, 2012) . Although the threat of such punitive measures has the potential to create enforcement power to the linked agreement, there is a dispute about the imposition concerning their credibility on the one hand, and their compliance with the non-discrimination rules of the WTO on the other. (Ederington, 2010) This paper is naturally rooted in the tradition of the literature on negotiation linkage. As such, the potential for the success of a climate coalition in terms of effectiveness and stability crucially depends on the choice of the linked issue as can be learned from the literature. Contributions on R&D-related issue linkages observe that R&D cooperation usually provides a competitive advantage to signatories based, for instance, on a more efficient technology. But this advantage tends to disappear when the coalition size increases. As a consequence, signatories might find it optimal to exclude some countries from the joint environmental and R&D agreement. (Carraro/Siniscalco, 1997 , Botteon/Carraro, 1998 and Carraro, 1999 Further gains from R&D cooperation might be even more diminished if technological spillovers to non-signatories are taken into account (Buchner et al., 2002 and Kemfert, 2004) . Previous trade-related approaches focus on different policies liberalizing trade that are harmonised vis-à-vis non-signatories. More precisely, Barrett (1997b) and Finus/Rundshagen (2000) propose the establishment of a free trade agreement among signatories of the IEA combined with a trade ban or a common tariff against non-signatories, respectively.
They find that, under favourable circumstances, welfare as well as participation can be enhanced.
However, in other cases, issue linkage fails to pose a credible threat because it reduces the welfare of signatories too. Focusing on a traditional free trade agreement, Conconi/Perroni (2002) show for a three-country model with segmented markets that enforced multiple negotiations on environmental and trade issues can stabilise or destabilise full cooperation by eliminating partially overlapping agreement structures which would result from separate negotiations. The outcomes are determined by the importance of trade and the elasticity of policy responses to changes in the valuation of marginal damages since these factors constitute the gains from blocking trade and the possibility of counteracting free-riding on the environment.
Compared to the existing literature, we would like to propose a more general kind of incentive mechanism. Given a world of bilateral trade regulation put in place more or less regularly, signatories of a climate coalition should benefit if, at the same time, they could join a free trade arrangement and enjoy the trade privileges provided. The idea of linking exclusive market and trade benefits to the formation of a climate coalition is currently experiencing a revival within the so-called 'climate club' literature. 8 But, to our knowledge, the coalition-building process with such an incentive mechanism has not been analyzed in a formal way so far for the n-country case.
To be able to capture the relevant aspects in both, trade and climate change, an appropriate trade model may be used. The difficulty one might experience here obviously lies in determining the trade pattern prevailing inside the free trade area as well as outside to properly assign the free trade privileges.
Therefore, in the paper we consider a model in the tradition of the strategic trade theory whose basic framework goes back to Eichner/Pethig (2012 , 2013a , 2013b , 2015a , 2015b This set-up requires that the trade flows inside and outside the area of the free trade arrangement must be traced. For this purpose, we need to appropriately model firms' supplies to the various domestic and foreign destination markets regarding a dirty as well as a clean good. Differentiated producer prices and transaction costs naturally have to be taken into account. As a main result of our analysis, we find evidence for the thesis that a free trade agreement can strongly promote the formation of a climate coalition if it is linked to the trade privileges granted.
More precisely, we employ a model in which the strategic trade and environmental policies of the climate coalition vis-à-vis non-signatories are carried out individually (but not independently).
Thereby, excludable benefits are entirely generated by preferential trade liberalisation while any punishment or retaliation mechanisms are ruled out. Furthermore, coalition members do not necessarily need to harmonise their tariff rates for maximizing joint welfare which is why incentives to deviate from the policies agreed on do not arise. However, for the sake of simplicity, we may assume symmetry in the initial endowments, technologies, and preferences. As far as policy implications are concerned, such interlinked trade-climate agreements can be implemented by incorporating climate-related provisions within preferential trade agreements like TTIP or CETA. (Leal-Arcas,
2013)
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides the model with a focus on the microfoundations of the market equilibria and the trade patterns. In section 3 the strategic policies of fringe and coalition countries are modelled in a Stackelberg leader-follower framework at a given coalition size. The endogenous formation of the stable coalition is then explained in section 4, including a discussion on the internal and external stability. In section 5 the results of the numerical simulation of the analytical model are presented followed by some propositions on the role of the preferential free trade area in section 6. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
The Model
In the following model, we introduce a preferential free trade area which is open only to the signatories of an IEA such that the issue of climate protection is being interlinked with the privileges of trade liberalisation. 9 In this respect, to determine the trade pattern inside and outside the free trade area including the trade flows among the non-signatory countries is crucial. This is made possible by differentiating firms' supplies according to the markets of destination, both domestic and foreign markets. Vice versa, imports have to be differentiated according to the countries of origin. For this purpose, we tried to modify the usual framework for trade models appropriately as stated above.
The World Economy and the Global Environment
We consider a world economy with i = 1, . . . , n countries, each of which has an endowment r of a composite production factor at its disposal which can be used for the production of either a 'clean' consumer good, x i , or a 'dirty' consumer good, e i . The reason why e represents a dirty good is simply given by the fact that it is coupled with greenhouse gas emissions like CO 2 which naturally are modelled as a global public externality. The basic assumption is that the consumption of the dirty good, e 
with the parameter δ > 0 and with marginal damages increasing, i.e.
∂D ∂e
In our model, climate damages are assumed to be external to consumers since society's preferences for the environment will be reflected in the welfare function and are taken care of by the government. Global damages thus affect the welfare of any single country and cannot be ignored apart from any free-riding incentives. However, countries which opt for free-riding may view their impact on global warming negligible compared to the cost of emission abatement. This is exactly the challenge in the combat of a global public bad like it is the case with global warming. The more important is the formation of climate coalitions.
9 As mentioned above, we draw from the Stackelberg leader-follower framework by Eichner/Pethig (2013a , 2013b , 2015b for n countries as a starting point. The implementation of a free trade area may be considered as the main contribution of the enhanced model we are going to introduce.
10 Please note that the superscript D indicates quantities demanded.
Caps, Tariffs, and Preferential Trade Areas
National governments in principle have two kinds of policy instruments available to address environmental disruptions: a national system of emission permits trading and a trade tariff. Each government is able to set a national cap e i > 0 for ceiling carbon emissions and to auction the number of available emission permits e i at a permit price π i . Those households which want to consume the dirty good are required to hold a permit one for one to internalise, more or less perfectly, the externality. Additionally, governments can impose a trade tariff t i ∈ R which may take the form of an import tariff (t i > 0) or of an export tax (t i < 0). The tariff design is equivalent to a unit tax that decouples the domestic producer price of the dirty good from the foreign producer price. (Eichner/Pethig, 2013b) There is trade taking place in both goods among the various countries. Firms in each country are producing for the domestic as well as for foreign markets. Consequently, firms differentiate supplies with respect to the destination markets as already indicated. This applies to the clean as well as to the dirty good. Not only the prices differ firms receive on domestic and foreign markets, respectively, but the opportunity costs of shipping products abroad do as well. Vice versa, supplies on local markets must be considered as being composed of the imports from various foreign countries in addition to the domestic supply. Naturally, this is a standard feature in trade models.
However, this picture becomes even more complex as soon as an (endogenous) free trade area has to be incorporated into this framework. Then, countries that are part of the free trade area must discriminate between trade with coalition member states and with non-member states. Formally, it may be useful to first sort countries according to their group membership. If country i is a member of the climate and free trade agreement C := {1, 2, . . . , m}, it will be called a coalition country, i ∈ C. Accordingly, we call country i a fringe country if it is not a coalition member, i.e. i C, or, equivalently, i ∈ F := {m + 1, m + 2, . . . , n}, m ≤ n, where F gives the set of fringe countries. Furthermore, the tariff design must take into account that producers in coalition countries, i ∈ C are generally exempted from any import tariff imposed by any other coalition country, j ∈ C, j i. Consequently, firms of a coalition country i receive the domestic producer price p j +t j , t j ∈ R for their exports to a coalition country j, while producers from fringe countries, i C, just receive the producer price p j . Table 1 provides an summary of the producer prices prevailing within a preferential free trade arrangement as such. 
Country of Destination
j = i j ∈ C j C Country of Origin i ∈ C p i + t i p j + t j p j i C p i + t i p j p j
Producers
In each country, there is a perfectly competitive firm serving the domestic market as well as any potential foreign market. Thereby, it is reasonable to assume that the opportunity costs of providing the dirty good may crucially depend on the respective markets of destination. In general, firms not only must cover the varying transportation costs (at least to some extent) but must meet country-specific import regulations and standards as well. Therefore, any firm will want to differentiate its supply efficiently by taking the transaction costs into account.
A representative firm is located in each country i producing both, the dirty good as well as the clean good. The dirty good's production employs a decreasing returns-to-scale technology (in accordance with Eichner/Pethig (2013a , 2013b , 2015b ) and total production is composed of all supplies specifically made on the different markets of destination, e S ij .
11 The clean good in turn is produced under a constant returns-to-scale technology and taken as numeraire. Likewise, the country's factor constraint must hold such that the input factor in overall production must not exceed the available endowment, r. From this, the quadratic production possibility frontier (PPF)
for country i can be derived where the superscript S indicates quantities supplied throughout:
Furthermore, α x , α eij give the technology coefficients for the clean and the components of the dirty good, respectively and x > 0 denotes the maximum producible amount of the clean good.
The PPF T is found a decreasing and strictly concave function in any e S ij , that is
11 Here, the first index represents the country of origin and the second one represents the country of destination.
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For the sake of simplicity, we make use of the following specific technology coefficients:
In case of the dirty good, the assumption 0 < α H < α * is made, hence, opportunity costs shall be the same for all foreign destinations but are considered being generally higher for cross-border trade than for domestic trade for the reasons given above. 12 Therefore, we are able to rule out interfering comparative advantages in explaining trade patterns and environmental impacts, as we entirely try to focus on trade and environmental measures as implemented by coalition and fringe countries.
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Taking the prices on the local markets p 1 , . . . , p n and the tariff rates t 1 , . . . , t n as given, the representative firm in country i maximises its profits, Π i , subject to the PPF in (2) 
Naturally, firms in coalition and fringe countries face different optimisation problems due to the privileges of the free trade arrangement. Those lead to the following specific profit functions, referring to the prices given in Table 1 :
The optimal outputs derived from the first-order conditions of the profit maximisation problem yield:
These quantities naturally aggregate to the total supply function of the firm in country i:
Consumers
In each country i, a representative consumer is naturally facing the domestic consumer price Global emissions do not enter the utility function since they are external in the consumers' view.
However, the damage generated by climate change is taken into account in the national welfare functions as will be specified later on.
A representative consumer is maximizing utility U i (with a, b > 0) by choosing her demands for the clean and the dirty good, subject to the budget constraint:
where y i is the consumer's income. The consumer takes income as given, since it origins from the instantaneous transfer of all kinds of added value generated in the economy. Hence, income is composed of producer rents, permit income, as well as tariff income:
It will be determined along with the market equilibria. From the first-order conditions of the utility maximisation problem we can derive the demand for the dirty good as follows:
Markets and General Equilibrium
The model incorporates three kinds of markets which must be simultaneously cleared in the general equilibrium. First, as the demand for the dirty good invokes an equal demand for permits in the national emissions trading scheme, the national permit markets are in equilibrium if the following condition holds:
with e i being the emission cap set by the national government. This yields the equilibrium permit price π * i .
Second, there is a world market for good X, the numeraire, sold at a world price set equal to p x ≡ 1. In equilibrium, the following market-clearing condition must hold:
Finally, in each country i, there is a local market for the dirty good sold at the local price p i .
These markets are in equilibrium if the following conditions hold simultaneously:
As can be seen in equation (13), the total supply on the local market in country i is the aggregated sum of all imports originating from all foreign firms j i in addition to the supply of the domestic firm i.
By substituting the firms' supplies from (6a) and (6b) for the RHS in (13), and by replacing demand with the emission cap from (11) for the LHS in (13) the equilibrium price of the dirty good can be determined:
The price is increasing in the cap but decreasing in the tariff rate,
∂ei > 0 and
The impact of a change in the tariff rate turns out to be larger if country i is a coalition member due to the feedback effect of the tariff − (m−1)α H ti (n−1)α H +α * within the coalition. By replacing the equilibrium prices (p * 1 , . . . , p * n ) in the total supply function (7) and replacing the quantities in the PPF from (2), the equilibrium quantities of the dirty good e S i * and the clean good x S i * are given.
The equilibrium demand for the clean good can be obtained by combining the budget constraint in (8) and the equilibrium quantities and prices from above in addition to the income functions (9a) and (9b), respectively:
By doing so, it can be shown that Walras' Law holds since, in (15a), the difference in brackets which indicates the net tariff income of a coalition country i coming from the other coalition members j ∈ C, j i will be equal to zero. Hence, if all local markets of the dirty good are in equilibrium, the world market for X must be in equilibrium as well.
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Welfare
The role of a country's government is to maximise national welfare. The welfare function of country i is given by consumer rents (including redistributed income) net of environmental damages
. By replacing demands using condition (11), as well as utility and damages, welfare W i of country i is a function of the policies given the policy schemes of all the other countries:
It becomes apparent that the welfare of a coalition member is different from that of a fringe country due to the unequal consumption possibilities of the clean good, x D i , which are determined by the interdependency of the markets involved. Hence, the welfare function of a coalition country, W i∈C , as well as the one of a non-coalition country, W i C , differ in the following term:
The difference on the RHS indicates the net income of country i arising from the total gains of preferential free trade among the members of the climate coalition.
Benchmark Cases
In the subsequent analysis, two benchmark scenarios will form the basis for the effectiveness measures which we will use for the evaluation of the Stackelberg solution. The first benchmark is the 'Business As Usual' (BAU) scenario which gives the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, equivalent to the outcome of the Stackelberg game at coalition size m = 0. In this situation, every country i chooses non-cooperatively a policy scheme (e i , t i ) that maximises its individual welfare, taking as given the other countries' policy choices. The optimal BAU emission caps e BAU and tariff rates t BAU can be derived from the first-order conditions of the welfare maximisation 14 Please find the proof for equation (17) attached in the appendix.
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problem for country i, yielding:
As can be seen in equation (19), even with policies being chosen independently, there are incentives to pursue protectionist trade policies by imposing a positive tariff rate t BAU > 0.
As a second benchmark, the fully cooperative outcome will be calculated assuming that there is a supranational body having the power to enforce cooperation. We refer to this situation as the 'Social Planner' (SP) scenario which is equivalent to the computation of the Stackelberg game with the exogenous coalition size m = 10. With the purpose of maximizing global welfare, defined as the sum over the welfare of all countries, the social planner chooses the entire environmental and trade policies (e 1 , . . . , e n , t 1 , . . . , t n ). The resulting policy schemes e SP and t SP are:
t SP = 0
As a matter of course, the social planner prefers the environmental policy instrument to internalise the climate externality combined with worldwide free trade. Coalition countries are maximizing joint welfare by coordinating environmental and trade policies but do not necessarily have to harmonise policies. In the second stage, fringe countries are maximizing their own welfare by taking the policies of the coalition as well as those of fringe countries into account. In this respect, fringe countries are viewed as non-cooperative Nash players. In the third stage, agents behave perfectly competitive, taking the governmental policies as given when they maximise their rents from the production and consumption of commodities.
The solution of the Stackelberg game proceeds by backward induction. Fringe countries are facing the optimisation problem:
where 
Concerning the optimisation problem of the coalition, member countries maximise the joint welfare of a coalition C:
where
Obviously, member countries can take advantage of anticipating how fringe countries will react to their strategies.
The solution of these optimisation problems brings about symmetric policy choices for the group of coalition countries (e C , t C ) on the one hand, and for that of the fringe countries (e F , t F ) on the other hand. However, this is just a consequence of the symmetric endowments and production technologies rather than a result of the negotiation game. Although a consideration of heterogeneous countries would, of course, lead to different policy regimes, the qualitative results regarding the benefits of free trade would not be affected.
Stability and Effectiveness of IEAs
So far, we have dealt with an arbitrary, exogenously given number of coalition countries within the Stackelberg leader-follower framework. In doing so, considerations on the endogenous formation of a coalition and its stability have been omitted from the analysis. Hence, we need to examine which one of the potential coalition sizes m ∈ [0, n] assures for a stable cooperation among member countries, or, put differently, which one constitutes a self-enforcing IEA.
In the non-cooperative IEA literature, the notion of stability has established as a canonical requirement for environmental treaties to ensure the long lasting existence of climate coalitions of a particular size.
16 In our framework, a coalition of a certain size is found to be self-enforcing if it satisfies the conditions of internal and external stability. A coalition C of size m is defined to be internally stable if no coalition country i, i ∈ C, has an incentive to leave the coalition, and it is considered to be externally stable if no fringe country i, i C, has an incentive to join the coalition. Accordingly, the following weak inequalities must hold:
In the subsequent analysis, we will also refer to some effectiveness indicators 18 proposed in the literature (e.g. by Eyckmans/Finus, 2007 and Eichner/Pethig, 2013b) which measure the success of an IEA in terms of the emission and, respectively, welfare gap 19 a climate coalition has been able to close. Therefore, the ratio RE (RW ) measures the relative effectiveness of emissions reduction (welfare gains) achieved as it is defined as the difference in global emissions (global welfare) between the BAU scenario and the Stackelberg equilibrium relative to the emission gap (welfare gap) indicated in the denominator:
16 The stability concept was originally elaborated by D' Aspremont et al. (1983) for the analysis of cartel formation in an oligopoly and later adapted to the IEA context (see Carraro/Siniscalco, 1993 , Barrett, 1994 , and many others). It should be noted that other stability and equilibrium concepts have been developed further by both, the cooperative and non-cooperative literature on coalition formation, implying different rules of the game. A comprehensive overview is provided by Bloch (1997) , Carraro/Marchiori (2003b) , Finus (2003) , Bréchet/Gerard/Tulkens (2011), among others.
17 It should be noted that the stability conditions are formulated for the case of symmetric countries. If heterogeneous countries were considered, the condition would require a reformulation to allow for asymmetries across countries (see, for instance, Carraro, 1999) .
18 These measures are also known as the 'closing the gap' indices. (Eyckmans/Finus, 2007) A similar indicator is the degree of externality introduced by Finus (2003) relating the actual and the BAU (emissions and welfare) outcomes to the social optimum.
19 The emission gap (welfare gap) is defined as the difference in global emissions (global welfare) between the BAU scenario and the SP scenario. Thereby, it represents the coalition's scope of potential emission reductions (potential maximum welfare gains).
20 Again, please note that the effectiveness measures RE and RW are only defined for the symmetric case. An analysis involving heterogeneous countries would require a reformulation.
The details of the parametrisation and a deeper discussion are presented in the following section.
Simulation Results and the Gains of the Free Trade Area
In As Figure 1 suggests, only a coalition of endogenous size m * = 7 turns out to be internally as well as externally stable. Given the fact that it is the only coalition size that can be sustained in the long run, the results for this particular coalition shall receive our special attention.
21 The parameter choice is made in accordance with Eichner/Pethig (2013b) .
In order to emphasise the effect of the preferential free trade arrangement on the coalition-building process, we will compare the results achieved with a situation where the PFTA is ruled out. In the absence of any tariff privileges, a traditional IEA is constituted which we may call the ¬P F T A scenario. In that case, the stable coalition size is found at m * = 3 confirming the standard results of the IEA literature. 
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Trade Policies. After having addressed the environmental policies, we would like to extend the discussion to the trade policies as part of the policy mix chosen by the two groups of countries.
These are of particular interest given the fact that they constitute the magnitude of the trade privileges provided within the coalition. As can be seen in Figure 6 , both fringe and coalition countries implement an import tariff rate, that is t C , t F > 0, based on the given parametrisation.
The most interesting result is that the tariff rates imposed by the coalition are low and decreasing in coalition size which implies that the coalition pursues a less protectionist trade policy. Fringe countries, in return, do not seem to be able to take advantage of their free-riding position and to raise their tariffs rates much above the BAU level. A comparison to the ¬P F T A scenario shows BAU level although both coalition and fringe countries suffer a loss in consumption utility compared to the strategy of unilateral free-riding, as can be seen by Figure 13 in the appendix. 24 The market outcomes shown in Figures 10 to 13 in the appendix illustrate that, in the linked Stackelberg game, the trade privileges of the PFTA provide a higher consumption utility for coalition countries than in fringe countries for coalition sizes of m ≤ 5 although consumption of the dirty good is more restricted. This is due to the expanded consumption possibilities with respect to the clean good which do not prevail in the fringe countries. However, the increase in consumption of the clean good is diminishing in the coalition size. Consequently, fringe countries outpace the coalitional consumption utility at some point due to the higher consumption levels of the dirty good which are also reflected in the utility function. For the case of a traditional IEA, consumption utility is always higher in fringe countries since coalition countries consume less of the clean good as they cannot take advantage of environmental dumping. higher tariff rates and thus a much more distorted allocation. Again, the linked agreement is much closer to the Social Planner solution than the one with the link missing. Moreover, since trade policies determine the gap between the price coalition and fringe producers receive, we may discuss their impact on firms' production decisions and, thereby, on the sectoral structure of countries.
Trade Patterns. In consideration of the fact that environmental policies take effect on the demand side, the supply structure shows a rather reversed picture. As production of the dirty good is not restricted by the cap, coalition countries can specialise in the production of the dirty good and fringe countries in the production of the clean good, albeit full specialisation is precluded by convex economies. The overall trade pattern, however, is such that the coalition has to net import the clean good from the fringe countries to meet its excess demand while the pattern for the fringe countries turns out to be reversed.
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Terms of trade. As a matter of course, the trade equilibrium described above is largely driven by the terms of trade prevailing for the coalition and fringe countries in the scenarios considered.
In view of the fact that there is no single world market for the dirty good but rather n local markets, the terms on which a coalition country i ∈ C can export the dirty good is given by the price it receives on a fringe market relative to the coalitional price, i.e.
. Likewise, the terms of trade of a fringe country i C must then be the reciprocal value of this price ratio,
The findings for the numerical simulation are shown in Figure 8 . Of course, this is a consequence of the increased strategic advantage of the climate coalition. In the ¬P F T A scenario, the difference in the terms of trade between the groups turns out to be much smaller due to the absence of preferential trade privileges within the coalition. From this, we can conclude that PFTA succeeds in altering the terms of trade favourably which is enabled 25 Please note that the graphs indicating the trade volumes exported to a fringe country, e S CF and e S F F , are exactly overlapping in Figure 7 . Moreover, in the ¬P F T A scenario, the curves of the supplies designated to a coalition market, e S F C and e S CC , superpose as well. 26 Please find this outcome depicted by Figure 14 and Figure 15 in the appendix. 27 Again, this definition of the terms of trade refers to symmetric countries and is expressed in terms of the clean good because all local prices of the dirty good are in fact relative prices divided by px = 1.
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by a diversion of trade flows of the dirty good within the coalition. Therefore, free trade provides a competitive advantage to coalition firms over fringe firms as far as trade volumes of the dirty good are concerned.
Economic Intuition. In order to explain how the policy outcomes materialise and how policies will govern prices and the trade pattern, we would like to give an economic intuition for the simulation results. Although both, coalition and fringe countries have two policy tools available, they use these instruments very differently to maximise welfare: On the one hand, coalition countries opt for pretty strict emission caps to internalise the climate externality and keep distortionary tariffs moderate. This finding is clearly a result of the fact that, as the coalition grows in size, the environment gets more and more valued. At the same time, terms of trade improve, remarkably not at the expense of environmental quality. On the other hand, fringe countries opt for pretty lax caps but high tariff rates because, in their view, emission damages are almost external and free-riding thus is welfare-enhancing. Overall, we find policies being chosen as one would expect from an environmental point of view.
What we would like to emphasise, above all, is that the outcomes are perfectly in line with what we had in mind with the implementation of a free trade area. It can be shown that the PFTA has a major impact on the market for the clean good which, in turn, alters consumption utilities and the welfare of countries. The tariff privileges provided to member states shifts consumption away from the dirty to the clean good to the advantage of producers and consumers within the coalition.
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In contrast, fringe countries must increase production of the clean good since exports of the dirty good to the coalition are not as profitable as under unilateral tariff policies. Moreover, they have to curb consumption even below the BAU level. The change in the consumption possibilities of the clean good changes consumption utility for coalition countries favourably and it deteriorates that of the fringe which makes it more beneficial to join the climate coalition when it is linked to a free trade agreement. Finally, this leads to a fairly large coalition which is successful in preserving the environment while the number of countries still opting for a free ride is pretty low.
Sensitivity Analysis
In the following, we are conducting a sensitivity analysis to quantify the advantage of a free trade area in terms of effectiveness and stability for different parameter constellations. 29 The results of a variation in the production coefficients are shown below in Table 2 provides an insight into the interrelation between the stability and effectiveness outcomes and the parametrisation: First, for the scenario with the preferential free trade agreement, the stable coalition size m * grows as the opportunity cost of the dirty good, α H and α * , increase. This is an expected outcome because, as the dirty good becomes more expensive in terms of the clean good, the incentives of the countries to take a free ride decrease. Furthermore, the advantage of the SP scenario over the BAU is diminishing since the dirty good is already consumed less in the BAU scenario due to its cost-intensive production. This finding is supported by the fact that the emission and welfare gaps are decreasing in α H and α * . At the same time, the relative effectiveness of the climate coalition is increasing as measured by RW and RE (except for the case of α H = 1000 and α * = 1100). It can also be shown that, by linking the climate treaty with a free trade agreement, the grand coalition can be stabilised with the technology parameters of α H = 2250 and α * = 2475 which brings about the SP solution in a self-enforcing way.
For the purpose of comparison, the production coefficients α H and α * have also been altered for the ¬P F T A scenario, as Table 3 illustrates.
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29 The sensitivity analysis for the other parameters suggests that stability as well as the relative effectiveness measures RE and RW are consistently decreasing in b, δ, and n which confirms the findings by Eichner/Pethig (2015b) . Therefore, we have decided to concentrate on the most striking findings, resulting from a variation in the production coefficients α H and α * .
30 Since the two scenarios refer to the same benchmarks, emission and welfare gaps are found to be identical and, 
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In summary, the results suggest that, except for parameter values less than or equal to α H = 1000
and α * = 1100, the preferential free trade area always performs better than unilateral trade policies among coalition countries, for the parameters considered.
Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper has been to address the role of trade liberalisation for the endogenous formation of climate coalitions. We find strong support for linking climate negotiations to negotiations on a PFTA while strategic trade and environmental policies vis-à-vis non-signatories are carried out individually. More precisely, in doing so, we tried to examine how the size, effectiveness, and stability of the climate coalition could be driven by the benefits of trade liberalisation.
The main focus of the analysis is on the exploitation of trade privileges given to members of the climate coalition such that the PFTA serves as an incentive mechanism to join the coalition.
The parametrical simulation shows evidence that the welfare gains provided by free trade improve therefore, left out in Table 3 . This implies that the denominators of the RE and RW measures are the same in case of the ¬P F T A agreement. 31 More precisely, this outcome can be reduced to the fact that emission reductions (welfare gains) achieved by the traditional IEA fall by a larger amount than the emission gap (welfare gap) in the denominator.
not only the effectiveness of the climate coalition in terms of emission reduction but also its stability by discouraging free-riding. Our approach entails a stable coalition size of m * = 7 in the numerical simulation. This result is explained by a favourable shift of the terms of trade that enables the coalition to consume more of the clean good while consumption of the dirty good is diminished. At the same time, the shift in the consumption pattern facilitates emission reduction within the coalition which, compared to the BAU scenario, leads to a significant mitigation of global emissions and climate change damages. As a consequence, global welfare is found growing.
Moreover, the findings of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the gains from the free trade agreement are in line with the size of the opportunity costs of the dirty good. For most of the parameter values considered, the linked agreement outperforms the single-issue IEA in terms of emissions and welfare effectiveness. Only in the special case of the dirty good being very cheap relative to the clean good, outcomes turn out to be in disfavour of the free trade agreement. But interestingly, if the climate agreement is not linked to a free trade area, the effectiveness of the coalition will be decreasing in the size of the opportunity costs of the dirty good. All in all, in our framework, issue linkage with trade liberalisation is found to have the potential to promote and sustain broader international cooperation on climate change.
Regarding the policy implications of our analysis, it might be argued that issues related to trade and climate change should, at any rate, be dealt with together in international negotiations, irrespective of how such a linkage is implemented. Issue linkage following a top-down approach could involve joint multilateral negotiations of both the UNFCCC and WTO regimes. However,
given the slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO context, a bottom-up approach could be even more effective for the short-term implementation of mitigation measures (Kernohan/De Cian, 2007) . The legal compatibility of climate clubs with the WTO regime has been examined by Leycegui Gardoqui/Ramírez (2015) who find several ways for how a legal space could be built for this approach within the WTO. In this respect, our findings make a good case for the formulation of an explicit amendment to the WTO regulatory framework to cover the problems arising from climate change such that the tariff regime proposed would be legalised in accordance with the WTO principles, the MFN (Most-Favoured Nation) principle in particular. 
Stability in the ¬P
